Book review of The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, edited by Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat, Karin Oellers-Frahm and Christian J Tams, Oxford University Press and of The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, by Hugh Thirlway, by Messineo, Francesco
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Messineo, Francesco  (2014) Book review of The Statute of the International Court of Justice:
A Commentary, edited by Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat, Karin Oellers-Frahm
and Christian J Tams, Oxford University Press and of The Law and Procedure of the International
Court of Justice: Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, by Hugh Thirlway,.  Review of: The Statute of
DOI
http://doi.org/10.3366/elr.2014.0189




The Edinburgh Law Review 18.1 (2014): 150-173
Edinburgh University Press
© Edinburgh Law Review Trust and the Contributors
www.euppublishing.com/elr
Reviews
EdinLR Vol 18 pp 150-153
DOI: 10.3366/elr.2014.0189
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
A COMMENTARY. Ed by Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat, Karin Oellers-
Frahm and Christian J Tams
Oxford: Oxford University Press (www.oup.com), 2nd edn, 2012. lii + 1745 pp. ISBN
9780199692996. £295.
Hugh Thirlway, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE: FIFTY YEARS OF JURISPRUDENCE
Oxford: Oxford University Press (www.oup.com), 2013. lxxvi + 1104 pp. (vol. I), xxxii + 812 pp.
(vol. II). ISBN 9780199668250. £275.
Although international courts and tribunals nowadays come in many varieties, the International
Court of Justice maintains a special role in the complex network of international dispute
settlement bodies. As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, it is the only
permanent court of general international law open to all states wishing to subject themselves
to its jurisdiction. Its jurisprudence is relied upon as authoritative by other courts as well as
states, international organisations, scholars, practitioners and generally by all “speakers” of the
language of public international law. The two reference works under review here analyse
the Court’s case law and its procedure adopting different but complementary approaches. The
Commentary offers a textual, rule-by-rule analysis of the relevant provisions of the Court’s
Statute and of the UN Charter; it does not purport to analyse the points of substantive
law decided by the Court over time, nor its case-law as such. By contrast, the Law and
Procedure analyses the Court’s case-law topic by topic. Its main focus (occupying around two
thirds of the two volumes it comprises) is the jurisprudence of the Court on those areas of
substantive international law on which it has pronounced itself, such as the sources of law,
treaty interpretation, the law of the sea, etc.. The remaining third of the book is devoted
to those questions of jurisdiction, competence and procedure which fall squarely within the
Statute’s (and thus also the Commentary’s) remit, again from the point of view of the Court’s
statements thereupon.
The Commentary is now in its second edition. The editorial team has slightly
changed –Christian Tams has joined Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat and Karin
Oellers-Frahm as editor, while Maral Kashgar and David Diehl are the new assistant
editors – but the structure of the book and the list of nearly fifty prominent authors is virtually
untouched, except for two new chapters, one on evidentiary issues and one on counter-claims.
Such overall continuity is wise: at its first appearance in 2006, the Commentary successfully
addressed a clear gap in the literature. The decades-old treatise concerning the Court’s
predecessor, Statut et règlement de la Cour permanente de justice internationale: éléments
d’interprétation by B S von Stauffenberg (Berlin: Heymann, 1933) was clearly outdated,
150
Vol 18 2014 reviews 151
so that readers in search of procedural guidance concerning a point in the ICJ’s Statute would
have usually resorted to S Rosenne’s masterful but costly classic, the Law and Practice of the
International Court, 1920-2005 (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2006). Not much help came from French
quarters, either: the shorter La Cour internationale de justice (Paris: LGDJ) by M Dubisson
has unfortunately not been updated since 1964, and Guyomar’s Commentaire du règlement de
la Cour internationale de justice (Paris: Pedone, 1973 and 1983) is both rather outdated and
narrower in scope than the book under review.
The Commentary’s strength is that it provides an authoritative, comprehensive and up-
to-date account of the procedural law of the ICJ through the provisions of the Statute. For
each Article analysed, it proceeds in three steps. It opens with a detailed historical overview,
including reference to the drafting history and to the PCIJ Statute’s corresponding provision;
then comes an in-depth analysis of the scope and content of the provision, with extensive
reference to the practice of the Court and to its jurisprudence, as well as to relevant Rules
of Court and Practice Directions; finally, there is an overall evaluation of the provision.
A select bibliography accompanies most Articles. In addition, certain thematic chapters cover
introductory or general themes not specifically linked to a Statute provision, such as the
relationship between the ICJ and other courts, the (rather elusive) “general principles of
procedural law”, counter-claims, evidentiary issues, discontinuance and withdrawal of cases.
This structure makes the Commentary a rather complex book. Its list of authors includes
scholars and practitioners based in Germany (a sizeable majority), the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Spain, the United States, as well as Australia, Denmark,
France, Italy, Israel, and China. But despite their different (though not exactly diverse)
backgrounds, the contributors all employ a common language and methodology: the book
is a brilliant example of contemporary legal positivism of the textual/doctrinal variety, a
mode of scholarship in which the German school of international law has traditionally led
the way.
A point of criticism is due concerning a minor but irksome issue: the editorial decision
to disregard established conventions concerning the citation of contentious cases brought to
the ICJ by special agreement. Both in the Court’s own practice and in academic writing, the
standard approach is to refer to cases introduced through a compromis by inserting a forward
slash mark (“/”) rather than a versus sign (“v.”) between the Parties’ names; thus, Burkina
Faso/Mali is immediately distinguishable from Nicaragua v. United States, the former being a
case brought by special agreement, the latter being a case brought under other jurisdictional
headings. This elegant graphic distinction conveys a great deal of information in a simple way,
and it is very helpful when quickly considering lists of authorities on any procedural issue on
which the existence of a compromis may have a bearing. The Commentary’s unusual choice
to employ “/” for all contentious cases creates needless confusion. The Editors’ justifications
for this are unpersuasive, as they refer to the consensual nature of the Court’s jurisdiction in
all cases (xxi). But the point is that a case brought by special agreement is one brought by
the parties together, not by one “in opposition to” (“versus”) the other. Special agreement
cases may differ from other contentious cases in terms of jurisdiction, admissibility, and
applicable law. The Editors may wish to reconsider this choice in the third edition of the
Commentary.
Another issue is that certain editorial slips can be found here and there, as is bound to
happen in such a complex work. For example, Oellers-Frahm’s discussion of the binding nature
of provisional measures contains a rather puzzling mistake carried over from the previous
edition. While the introductory remarks (1062-1063) correctly refer to the significance of the
LaGrand case to this question (see LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment,
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I.C.J. Reports 2001, 466), the immediately subsequent section titled “the jurisprudence of the
Court” affirms that “[t]he Court never made a clear statement concerning the legal effect of
provisional measures” (1064). Something thus seems amiss. The discussion is then rectified by
a whole section devoted to the LaGrand case (1066-1069), which is said to be “surprising in
its unambiguous clarity, for it plainly states that provisional measures are binding” (1067). This
section of the Commentary may thus seriously mislead the inattentive reader.
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the Commentary remains an indispensable tool for
practitioners and academics alike. This is also true of the Law and Procedure, which is the
culmination of decades of work by one of the most accomplished experts on the Court,
and sometime Principal Legal Secretary thereof, Hugh Thirlway. It basically consists of a
hardbound reprint of his two influential series of articles on the Court’s jurisprudence that
appeared in the British Year Book of International Law (BYIL) from 1989 to 2003 and from
2005 to 2011 respectively. These were the continuation of an analogous series of articles by Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice that appeared between 1950 and 1963 and that were eventually collected
as The law and procedure of the International Court of Justice (Cambridge: Grotius, 1986).
Each of the two series by Thirlway is bound in a separate volume following a shared table of
contents.
What sets the Law and Procedure apart from most literature on the Court is the
combination of a topic-oriented approach with a critical analysis of the Court’s decisions
going well beyond the descriptive. One can easily find elsewhere some excellent case-by-
case summaries, of varying degrees of conciseness, from the series published by the UN
with the assistance of the Court’s Registry (www.un.org/law/ICJsummaries/) to the recent
digests by G Dahlhoff (International Court of Justice, digest of judgments and advisory
opinions, canon and case law 1946-2012, Leiden: Nijhoff, 2012) and by P M Eisemann and
P Pazartzis (La jurisprudence de la Cour internationale de Justice, Paris: Pedone, 2008).
One can also find useful thematic repositories of the Court’s statements of the law, such
as the World Court Digest, a free online database edited at the Max Planck Institute
for Comparative Public Law and International Law (http://www.mpil.de/en/pub/research/
details/publications/institute/wcd.cfm). But the Law and Procedure series is different, because
it had the ambition of commenting substantively on the Court’s case law in a thematic
fashion over the course of more than twenty years – an endeavour which would have tried
the endurance of many other scholars, all the more so considering Thirlway’s admirable
claim that “no research assistants have been harmed in the making of this book” (vii).
Indeed, the Court’s jurisprudence evolves enough over relatively short periods of time that
achieving comprehensiveness is a perpetually self-defeating task, as one is bound to note when
contemplating what use remains of previous monumental attempts at a complete systematic
commentary of the ICJ’s (and the PCIJ’s) case law organised by subject, such as E Hambro’s
The case law of the International Court (Leiden: Sijthoff, 8 vols each covering multiple subjects,
1952-1976) and P. Guggenheim’s Répertoire (Genève: Droz, 5 vols. each devoted to a different
major topic, 1961-1989).
The style and content of the Law and Procedure clearly benefit from being single-authored:
Thirlway’s take on the Court’s jurisprudence comes alive at every page. He offers a detailed
critical analysis of the state of the case-law on each sub-topic, with attempts at de-coding the
judicial (and non-judicial) policy considerations which may have produced certain decisions by
the Court (see e.g. 935 on jurisdictional issues concerning provisional measures). The line of
argument of the Court is scrutinised with reference to possible alternatives, and great attention
is devoted to the separate and dissenting opinions of Members of the Court, especially when
they highlight points with which Thirlway agrees or disagrees (see e.g. 1782-1785). Thirlway’s
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criticism at times borders on the scathing. For example, in his discussion of the binding nature
of provisional measures, Thirlway spares no argument against LaGrand (960 ff), which he
considers “naked judicial legislation on both the procedural and the substantive level” (965)
and “a disaster” for “the system of international judicial jurisdiction” (968).
Because of these features, Thirlway’s series of BYIL articles is of great importance, and will
remain so for many years to come. Precisely for this reason, one is left with the sensation that
this 2013 “complete edition” was a missed opportunity to update and bring all the material
together in monographic form. Although the Law and Procedure is certainly a beautiful set of
two nicely bound volumes offering easy access to materials otherwise scattered among many
BYIL volumes, it is legitimate to wonder what its actual added value is compared to the BYIL
version of the two series. One answer is that the index, the joint table of contents and the extra
footnotes pointing to newer decisions of the Court adopted until 2012 are all very useful tools.
But a unified version of the articles, proceeding subject by subject and updated until late 2012,
would have been an even better addition to the literature on the Court. Thirlway acknowledges
in the preface that it was indeed his original intention to combine the two series of articles into
one, but the task proved understandably too cumbersome in light of the extensive re-writing
which would have been necessary (vi). Such an ambitious project would also have allowed
him to abandon some aspects of Sir Gerald’s original table of contents, which may appear
too constraining today in view of how the Court’s jurisprudence has developed. For instance,
the lack of a discrete section on the use of force in international law is quite striking (self-
defence is only treated as one of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness in the context
of international responsibility, 606-610 and 1530-1539), and a new table of contents would
probably include subjects such as environmental law and human rights, understandably not
included in Sir Gerald’s time.
The different approaches of the Commentary and the Law and Procedure only affect the
way the books are used in practice, not how well-informed one is about a certain topic after
reading them. Even for those parts in which they overlap topic-wise, one is best advised
to read both: Thirlway’s distinctive approach will often be different from that of one of the
many authors of the Commentary. Although they are reference works, the Commentary and
the Law and Procedure are not sterile descriptions of settled law (if such a thing exists in
international law), but complex narratives of the multifarious statements of the Court. Indeed,
taken together, the two books constitute an indispensable starting point for any contemporary




EdinLR Vol 18 pp 153-155
DOI: 10.3366/elr.2014.0190
Kirsten Sellars, “CRIMES AGAINST PEACE” AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (www.cambridge.org), 2013. xv + 316 pp. ISBN
9781107028845. £70.
Kirsten Sellars’ highly readable book is a diplomatic and legal history of the attempts
made during the twentieth century to establish crimes against peace as a separate crime in
international law. Her assiduous use of the political and diplomatic record to illuminate the
